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Abstract In direct competition between national brands of consumer pack-
aged goods (CPG), one brand often has a large local share advantage over the
other despite the similarity of the branded products. I present an explanation
for these large and persistent advantages in the context of local competition on
perceived quality or brand image. The main result of the analysis is a relation
between varying degrees of product similarity and equilibrium outcomes of
local share advantages. Namely, I find that asymmetric quality positioning and
associated local share advantages emerge especially when competing brands
are objectively similar. Conversely, local share asymmetries based on brand
positioning occur less when brands are dissimilar. This paper provides two
reinforcing intuitions for this result. First, if brands are objectively similar,
different levels of investment in local quality perceptions co-exist in equilib-
rium in the same market, because this investment is often borne as fixed cost.
Also, early movers will invest in high perceived quality, whereas late movers
have less incentive to invest because of demand sharing and increased price
competition. Second, if the local advantages are shared by competitors across
markets, the persistence of these advantages is reinforced by multimarket
contact. Even when local brand building is free, firms may not want to
improve perceived quality in their “weak” markets if it initiates retaliation
by the competition in their “strong” markets. The increase in multimarket
profits from collusion is large when the products are similar, because price
competition looms large.
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1 Introduction
Brands of consumer package goods (CPG) in the United States often lack
meaningful product differentiation on attributes other than brand labels and
would be difficult to correctly identify based on taste tests alone (Carpenter
et al. 1994; Trout and Rivkin 2000). If two products are physically identical,
except perhaps for brand labels, utility maximizing consumers should be
relatively indifferent between them. All else equal, therefore, demand for such
brands should be similar or at least not systematically different.
However, this simple intuition does not hold for CPG industries in two
ways. First, within markets, it is not true that seemingly similar brands have
the same market shares. To the contrary, there exist strong local asymmetries.
Second, across markets, the same national brand of repeat purchase goods
often has very different market shares, even after controlling for the influence
of regional or local brands. Market dominance is often limited to a subset
of local markets. Consider Fig. 1, which shows market shares for the two
largest manufacturers of brands of Mexican salsa, Campbell and Frito-Lay,
who sell the Pace and Tostitos brands, respectively. Both brands originate in
Texas and offer highly substitutable products. The figure demonstrates that the
two firms have very different shares within markets. Across markets, the two
firms seem to divide the domestic U.S. market in two territories, one for each
brand. Tostitos dominates along the East Coast, whereas Pace leads west of the
Mississippi. While local market-shares are clearly not constant across markets,
they are in fact constant in the medium term across time.1
Bronnenberg et al. (2006) show that these patterns are commonplace in
CPG industries such as coffee, mayonnaise, margarines, pickles, hotdogs, etc.
Given any one market and given the similarity of most national brands in the
aforementioned categories, the question addressed in this paper is: Why do
large local market advantages emerge in the face of little product differentia-
tion, and what sustains them? The answers provided in this paper are twofold
and focus on the interaction of product similarity (horizontal differentiation)
and firms’ efforts to influence perceived quality (vertical differentiation).
1This fact is illustrated by the fact that Fig. 1 represents the annual averages of market shares for
1996, suggesting that the differences in share are not simply due to temporary local marketing
programs.
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Campbell
min:0.09   max:0.75
Frito Lay
min:0.09   max:0.46
Fig. 1 Market shares of two leading manufacturers of mexican salsa
First, when providing high perceived quality comes at a cost, not all firms
may invest in high quality, although it is profitable for those who do ultimately
invest. This seems consistent with what happens in many CPG industries: in
each local market, a single or a small number of brands invest in quality
perceptions through advertising and distribution whereas other products do
not invest and play a fringe role (Bronnenberg et al. 2006). I find that the first
mover is the one who invests in high quality.
Second, when several firms have their own region of local dominance where
they are the sole provider of high perceived quality, local monopoly power
raises multimarket profits above those when all firms are symmetric, i.e., with
“average” share and high quality perceptions in all markets. Thus, firms have
an incentive to coordinate across markets. It has been argued (Karnani and
Wernerfelt 1985) that such multimarket coordination is at work in at least some
CPG industries.
Common to these two explanations, I find that the lower the degree of
product differentiation, the more likely unequal perceived quality and market
shares emerge in a given market and persist. Namely, I show that a lower
degree of horizontal product differentiation increases the incentive for the
seller of high quality products to maintain high quality and at the same time
decreases the incentive for the seller of the lower quality product to close the
quality gap. In effect, by endogenizing local perceptions of product quality,
the main finding of this paper is that when two products are objectively
similar, market shares for these products will more likely be different. Con-
versely, when products are different, market shares are similar across geogra-
phy, in the sense of globally reflecting objective quality differences rather than
strategically managed perceptions of quality.
In terms of contribution, this paper aims, first, to offer a simple theoretical
argument for why (the regionalization of) market dominance emerges in CPG
industries and why it persists. My model offers a very simple interpreta-
tion of regionalization of market dominance when local share asymmetries
span multiple contiguous geographical markets. This happens when there
is regionalization of moving first in choosing quality, e.g., through gradual
rollout by sellers from different geographic origins. Second, the paper aims to
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make a contribution to the literature on horizontal and vertical differentiation
(d’Aspremont et al. 1979; Neven and Thisse 1990; Shaked and Sutton 1981) by
outlining how the willingness to invest in the local vertical attribute depends
on the relative importance of the horizontal product attributes or the manufac-
turer’s capacity to horizontally differentiate. Third, an additional contribution
of the paper is that it solves the quality competition game within a logit demand
system. Theoretical predictions from this demand system may be more directly
testable in future empirical research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
reviews how consumers take non-product attributes such as advertising and
distribution as perceptual cues for product quality in CPG industries. Section 3
discusses a family of demand models with local quality perceptions. Section 4
establishes the basic relation between profits, perceived quality and prices in
a single market framework. Section 5 shows how asymmetric choices about
local perceived quality emerge. It also links these results to sequential entry.
Section 6 shows how market share asymmetries can be sustained in a multi-
market setting, even when improving quality perceptions is free. Section 7
discusses several empirical examples and interprets the main results in the
context of packaged goods. Section 8 concludes with future research directions.
2 Consumer quality perceptions
Although physical product characteristics are important determinants of qual-
ity perceptions, in this paper, brand advertising and distribution support
such as shelf-space are allowed to impact perceived quality also. There is
ample support for a link between advertising and quality inferences. For in-
stance, Kirmani and Wright (1989) find a positive relation between advertising
and consumer expectations about product quality. Further, brand awareness
is often a determinant of choice, especially for low involvement decisions
(Bettman and Park 1980; Hoyer and Brown 1990; Park and Lessig 1981).
In addition, there is a large and important literature in economics linking
persuasion advertising to inferences about product quality (Bagwell 2007;
Caves and Greene 1996; Comanor and Wilson 1974) and willingness to pay
(e.g., Sutton 1991).
There are also studies linking brand distribution and retail support to infer-
ences about brand quality. Simonson (1993) argues that consumers construct
preferences for non-durable goods at the point of purchase. In this context,
consumer may take large shelf space allocations for brands as a cue that
these brands are popular in a given local market. Therefore, more shelf space
and retailer support likely leads to the perception of higher quality for CPG.
Even if consumers do not acquire brand information themselves (Dickson and
Sawyer 1990; Hoyer 1984), broad distribution and shelf space allocations may
indirectly allow them to rely on the quality assessments of others.
In sum, while consumers in different markets may face the same physical
product when considering a nationally distributed brand, perceptions about
the quality of these brands are co-determined by local advertising and
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distribution (retailing) strategies of firms. Noteworthy in this context is that
the U.S. is partitioned in more or less discrete population centers across
which there is little consumer arbitrage,2 and across which advertising and
distribution strategies can be varied by firms. This set of conditions permits
local branding strategies. The next section considers a model in which 2 firms
can control quality perceptions locally.
3 Model
3.1 Demand
Utility I use an “address model” of consumer demand. In this model, con-
sumers h are characterized by a position zh in a K-dimensional attribute space
in RK. Consumers’ ideal points zh are not observed by the firm, but their
distribution across h is known. Products i = 1, 2 are also characterized by
a position zi ∈ RK in the attribute space, and this position is known to all.
Consumers h have a quadratic disutility for distance between ideal points zh
and the location of products zi (d’Aspremont et al. 1979). Utility for brand i by
household h = 1, ..., Nm in market m is specified by







where Yh is income of household h. The local quality attribute aim is a
quality perception that is influenced by positioning in the distribution and
communication channel and is controllable at the market level. pim is the price
of the product in market m. The scalar μ measures the consumer’s disutility
of products being far away from his ideal point and is a measure of horizontal
differentiation.
Quality perceptions I use the term quality perceptions to allow for the idea
that aim is not just driven by objective product characteristics but also by local
investments by the firms in regional advertising or shelf-space allocations by
retailers.
Brand positions in the physical attribute space I assume that there is one physi-
cal attribute zki (K = 1). The physical attribute, zi, is common to all consumers
in a market. To rule out a demand-focused explanation of asymmetries, I
initially assume that the location of products and consumers is symmetric
around zero. Owing to the presence of the multiplier μ, it can be assumed
without further loss in generality that the position of brand 1 is given by − 12
and of brand 2 by + 12 .
2In other words, it is generally too expensive for consumers to travel across advertising cells when
buying supermarket products. Observationally, this is equivalent to the constraint that consumers
are treated as immobile.
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Location of consumers’ ideal points in attribute space The consumer ideal
points zh ∈ R represent the idiosyncratic component of utility. I assume the
logistic density for the location of consumers
g(z) = exp −z
(1 + exp −z)2 , z ∈ R
1. (2)
Demand Consumers choose that alternative that maximizes their utility. De-
mand for product i among Nm consumers in market m is thus obtained by
finding the support of the consumer distribution, Eq. 2, for which product i
has the highest utility, Eq. 1. The utility components Yh and z2h do not affect
choice (they are common to alternatives). Given the symmetric positions, the
utility component z2i (i = 1, 2) also drops out of the utility comparisons. What
remains is the interaction zhzi of the location of consumers and products. Thus
the location of the consumers enters the utility comparison as a linear term,
and demand is given by a logit model (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 1992).
sim = Nm Pr
(









(a jm − pjm)/μ
] , i, j = 1, 2 (3)
For convenience and because its role turns out to be largely passive, markets
are all of equal size and total market size is normalized such that Nm = 1.
The logit demand formulation has broad appeal in both theoretical (e.g.,
Anderson et al. 1992), as well as empirical work (e.g., Berry et al. 1995). It is
noted that with a uniform distribution for g(z), a linear demand structure is
obtained. The results of our analysis generalize to this linear demand model.
If μ approaches 0, the demand model in Eq. 3 becomes a vertical model (also
called the neoclassical model—see Anderson et al. 1992, p. 45).
Because I initially wish to separate margin and multi-market contact effects
from demand expansion, the model used here does not account for an outside
good. This may be justified by realizing that for many mature categories such
as coffee, Mexican salsas, and alike, demand expansion in response to price
changes is small (Nijs et al. 2002). It can be shown that the main results of the
analysis generalize to the case of demand with an outside good, as long as that
outside good is not too large.
3.2 Supply
Marginal costs cim are assumed to be constant and independent of perceived
quality. Instead, the cost of creating quality perceptions through advertising
and/or distribution is fixed (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 1992; Bagwell 2007;
Sutton 1991). Investments in perceived quality are denoted K(aim) and may
depend on aim.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Perceived quality and prices.
Of initial interest is how perceived quality, aim, affects prices, pim, and profits,
πim. In this section, firms compete by first simultaneously deciding how much
to invest in quality perceptions aim. Conditional on these choices, firms next
simultaneously set prices. For now, firms can increase perceived quality at no
cost. Thus, the fixed cost Kim is initially zero. Later this restriction will be lifted.
The profit function for brand i in market m is πim = (pim − cim) · sim − Kim.
Given the sequence of decisions, prices are solved first. Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991) have shown that a unique Bertrand–Nash equilibrium in prices exists




= (pim − cim) · s′im + sim = 0, (4)
and from this, the implicit equation for the prices of interest is
p∗im − cim =
μ
1 − sim , i = 1, 2. (5)
The price equations are implicit because the right-hand side of the expression
for the markup contains prices pim, and perceived quality aim (through sim).
Using the last equation to solve for sim and substituting in the profit function
gives that at optimal prices
π∗im = p∗im − cim − μ − Kim. (6)
Define the local perceived quality gap as am ≡ a1m − a2m. Two useful depen-
dencies of local prices and – in view of Eq. 6 – of profits on this quality
gap are:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Prices)
1. The price of brand 1 increases and that of brand 2 decreases in am.
2. The price increase (decrease) is never larger than the increase in the per-









Proof see Appendix unionsq
Thus, the price for either brand increases as its perceived quality advantage
over the other brand widens. However, neither brand will adjust its price in
equal measure to improvements in perceived quality. Consumers get at least
part of the utility stemming from the perceived quality improvement. For a
related result, see Anderson et al. (1992), and Anderson and de Palma (2001).
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The next proposition considers the comparative statics in the second-stage
of the game to provide intuition for the effects of the vertical attribute on
pricing and profits, and provides the basis for the main results in the paper.
Proposition 2 (Perceived quality) Prices and profits are convex in the perceived
quality gap, am.
Proof see Appendix unionsq
Namely, first, as the perceived quality gap between two brands widens, the
marginal effect of am on prices and profits increases.3 Proposition 2 therefore
implies that low perceived quality brands are less impacted by an increase
in perceived quality, than high perceived quality brands are impacted by a
comparative decrease. As a consequence, the latter is willing to pay more for
sustaining a perceived quality gap than the former is willing to pay for closing
it, thus providing an important motivation for why asymmetries may emerge
in the market.
Second, in the case of multiple markets, firms can set aim in each market. By
Jensen’s inequality, the convexity result then implies that two firms, competing
on M markets, would prefer to have a distribution of market-specific quality




Before showing that these two arguments can produce stable market
outcomes, it is useful to formalize and discuss the interaction of horizontal
differentiation μ and vertical differentiation am = a1m − a2m in the model I
consider.
Proposition 3 (Interaction) The marginal effect of quality improvements on
profits diminishes in horizontal differentiation for the quality leader but in-








< 0 if aim > a jm
> 0 if aim < a jm
Proof see Appendix unionsq
To illustrate this proposition, consider two extreme cases. First, for μ very
small (limiting to 0), the leading firm will price its quality advantage almost




3The result is not specific to the logit demand function. A linear demand function is obtained by
replacing Eq. 2 with g(z) = 1, z = [−1/2, .., 1/2]. Then, profits at optimal prices can be shown to
equal π1 = 118 (3μ+am)
2
μ
− K (a1m) and π2 = 118 (3μ−am)
2
μ
− K (a2m), with am = a1m − a2m. From this
formulation, it is clear that the proposition replicates. The convexity result may not hold for other
demand systems.
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1 for this firm. For the firm that has the lower perceived quality and zero
demand, increasing its quality has no consequence (the quality leader would
just drop its price and still get all demand), i.e.,
dπim
daim
approaches 0 for the firm
that lags in quality. Thus, when products are similar, the lagging firm has no
incentive to invest in quality, whereas the leading firm has a positive pay-off to
investments in quality.
Second, for μ > 0, there are customers to whom the lower quality product is
preferred because it is closer to their ideal points. The perceived quality leader
now sets prices taking into account not only the perceived quality advantage
but also the adverse quantity effect of pricing too high. The marginal effect of
a quality improvement on prices and profits is therefore less than 1. For the
lagging firm, the effect of a quality improvement is no longer 0 but positive. I
subsequently show (in Proposition 5 below) that in the limit, as μ → ∞, the
marginal effect of a quality improvement on profits becomes equal for both the
leading and the lagging firm and has value 1/3.
Combining these cases, Proposition 3 implies that as μ increases from 0 to
infinity, the marginal effect of perceived quality improvements by the high
quality provider on profits continuously decreases from 1 to 1/3 in the case
of the higher quality brand and increases from 0 to 1/3 in the case of the lower
quality brand.
In sum, when there is little horizontal differentiation, the incentives to
maintain/dissolve differences in perceived quality are very different for the
high vs. the low quality firm. In contrast, if there is sufficient horizontal
differentiation, then the player with the high perceived quality has the same
incentive to maintain the quality gap as the low perceived quality player has to
close it. It is this contingency that makes that asymmetries in quality choices
depend on the existing degree of horizontal product differentiation.
4.2 The case of a single market and free quality improvements
Before showing the existence of asymmetric equilibria and their dependence
on μ, I first present the results of a benchmark case against which to compare
other results later. In this benchmark case, firms compete in a single market
and fixed cost is zero (K = 0). In this case, firms will end up positioning
symmetrically at the highest possible quality level (say aH).
Proposition 4 (Single Market) In the single market equilibrium both firms
position at aH and charge a price of c + 2μ. Profits are equal to μ − K.
Proof see Appendix unionsq
That is to say, given Proposition 1, both brands choose to set perceived
quality as high as possible. As a consequence, both brands set equal prices and
have equal market shares. The role of μ in this case is that, as expected, profits
88 B.J. Bronnenberg
and prices rise in the degree of horizontal differentiation.4 In other words,
if horizontal differentiation is effectively absent, price competition will drive
margins to zero.
I now consider how the above result can be avoided as a function of several
realities of brand competition in packaged goods industries: (i) absence of
strong horizontal differentiation, (ii) quality perceptions are costly to obtain
and are borne as fixed cost, (iii) firms meet in multiple geographic markets and
may have a first mover advantage in all or part of these markets.
5 Local asymmetries from competition in costly quality perceptions
5.1 Prices
Consider a single market (drop the subscript m momentarily) and fixed cost
K (ai) that depends on the local level of perceived quality ai. The costs
K (ai) represent investments in quality positioning (e.g., through advertising
or incentivising retailer support). Consumer response to investments in quality
perceptions is assumed to be a step function (e.g., Villas-Boas 1993). This
implies that firms consider two levels of perceived quality, say a or ah,
with ah > a. The assumption of a step function is made for simplicity. From
the literature on pulsing, S-shaped response functions are known to produce
similar policies (see e.g. Dubé et al. 2005; Little 1979). a is to be interpreted
as the quality perception that is obtained when the firm makes no investment.
The assumption that K(a) = 0 ensures that more than one firm enters in the
market. Demand is non-zero, even at zero investment in a, e.g., investment in
advertising (see, e.g., Little 1979) or distribution.
As before, firms first set perceived quality aim simultaneously and next
choose prices. Demand for brand i is given by Eq. 3. In a single market context,
profit for each of the manufacturing firms is equal to
πi = si (pi − c) − K (ai) (7)
From the first-order conditions, prices are equal to
p∗i = c +
μ
1 − si , (8)
whereas profits at optimal prices can be expressed as
π∗i =
μsi
1 − si − K (ai) . (9)
5.2 Perceived quality
Asymmetric positioning Consider first the case where brand 1 is positioned at
ah while brand 2 is positioned at a. When is this an equilibrium? For brand
4Soberman (2002) shows however that in a single market, if consumers differ with respect to their
awareness of products, the monotonicity of profits in differentiation may not hold.
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1, profit at the optimal prices computed above equals π∗1 = μ − K (ah) ,
with  = s1
1 − s1 . The ratio  is the ratio of the demand for the high per-
ceived quality brand over the low perceived quality brand, i.e.,  ≡ (ah, a).
Proposition 1 implies that  > 1, because the brands are priced such that
consumers receive at least a part of the utility stemming from quality improve-
ments. Suppose firm 1 considers changing its position from ah to a. If so, it will
share the market evenly with firm 2 (which is also positioned at a) and, from
Eq. 9, its profits would equal μ − K(a). Thus, firm 1 will not position at a as
long as μ − K (ah) > μ − K(a).
Firm 2, positioned “low,” will not reposition if the payoff of sustaining a
is larger than that of repositioning to ah. This implies that μ−1 − K (a) >
μ − K(ah). By combining these results, and substituting that K (a) = 0 neither
firm has an incentive to deviate from asymmetric positioning as long as
μ
(
1 − −1) < K (ah) < μ( − 1). (10)
Note that μ
(
1 − −1) < μ( − 1) because  > 1. Thus, there always a level
of fixed costs K (ah) that makes asymmetric positioning an equilibrium.
Symmetric positioning With symmetric positioning at a , the profits for both
firms are π∗i = μ − K(a). If either firm repositions to ah, profits of that firm
will be μ − K(ah). Thus, if K (ah) > μ ( − 1) , then repositioning will not
occur and a symmetric equilibrium with both firms positioned at a holds.
Following similar logic, a symmetric equilibrium at ah is obtained when it is
not profitable for either firm to reposition to a. This happens when K (ah) <
μ
(
1 − −1) .
The following proposition applies.
Proposition 5 (Costly quality perceptions—single market)
1. (a) Both brands position symmetrically at ah if K (ah) < μ
(
1 − −1) .
(b) Brands position asymmetrically with one at ah and the other at a if
μ
(
1 − −1) ≤ K (ah) ≤ μ ( − 1) .
(c) Both brands position symmetrically at a if K (ah) > μ ( − 1) .
2. (a) The range of cost K (ah) over which asymmetric positioning is an
equilibrium decreases monotonically in μ,












1 − −1) , μ ( − 1)} = {(ah − a) /3, (ah − a) /3}
Proof see Appendix unionsq
In sum, when it is cheap enough to position at ah, all firms will do so, whereas
when it is too expensive, neither firm will. However, over an intermediate
range of cost of investing in quality, one brand will position at ah and the other
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at a. Thus the cost of “branding” K(ah) can cause an asymmetric equilibrium
between firms to emerge in a single market. The asymmetry is due to the
differences in returns on investment in perceived quality between the high
quality and the low quality player discussed in Section 4.
The second part of the proposition says that asymmetric positioning of
brands occurs under more general conditions on cost when the degree of




1 − −1) , μ ( − 1)} in
the second part of the proposition marks the upper and lower limit on costs
K (ah) for which asymmetric market shares will result. This range can thus be
interpreted as a measure of the generality with which an arbitrary cost function
K(a), a > 0, obeys μ
(
1 − −1) ≤ K (ah) ≤ μ ( − 1) . If it is wide, any cost
differential will support an asymmetric market outcome. The proposition
states that when products are objectively the same, when μ approaches 0, the
range is widest. Conversely, if horizontal differentiation is more substantial,
the cost range will narrow, reducing the support for asymmetric equilibria, and
in the limit eliminating it completely.
The proposition above provides an argument for the emergence of asym-
metric market shares, but makes no prediction about who will choose ah and
who will choose a. I next consider the case where instead of making simulta-
neous decisions in perceived quality, firms set perceived quality sequentially
and next compete on price simultaneously. With these assumptions, I seek
to capture the scenario where one firm is the leader in quality choices, but
conditional on quality positioning, a Nash pricing game is being played.
Proposition 6 (Sequential moves)
1. (a) If K (ah) < μ
(
1 − −1) , both firms will choose ah and moving first has
no impact on equilibrium outcomes
(b) If μ
(
1 − −1) ≤ K (ah) ≤ μ ( − 1) the first mover in quality will
set perceived quality at ah and the late mover will set perceived quality
at a.
(c) K (ah) > μ ( − 1) , both firms will choose a and moving first has no
impact on equilibrium outcomes
Proof see Appendix unionsq
The first and third case simply echo Proposition 5 that when it is sufficiently
costly (cheap) to invest both players will play a (ah) . However, the second
case conveys that when asymmetric equilibria occur, it is always advantageous
for the first mover to choose the higher quality perception ah. Consequently,
the follower will choose a.
5This result holds also when Eq. 2 is replaced by g(z) = 1, z = [−1/2, ...,+1/2]. In that case








18μ . Clearly, this region widens (monotonically) as μ becomes
smaller.
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5.3 Graphical interpretation and discussion
In the preceding section, I found that when otherwise undifferentiated firms
compete on perceived quality, vertical differentiation emerges endogenously.
Figure 2a illustrates this finding from the result that profits are convex in
perceived quality differences a1 − a2. In this example, if firm 1 is positioned
at a1 = ah, and firm 2 is positioned at a2 = a, then the profit for firm 1 is
equal to C (= μ). At this combination of quality levels, profits for firm 2
are A (= μ−1). If both firms have the same level of quality then both of their
profits are equal to B (= μ) . The maximum investment firm 2 is willing to
make for repositioning to ah is the difference in profits B − A, whereas the
maximum investment firm 1 is willing to make to remain at ah is equal to
C − B. Therefore, as long as the cost to produce ah is between B − A and
C − B, different choices of perceived quality are an equilibrium. The second
part of proposition 5 implies that the difference between the intervals C − B
and B − A decreases in μ.
Thus, the existence of different market shares for brands selling close substi-
tutes within a market, can be explained as the competitive outcome of making
investments in perceived quality, e.g., through local brand building. The local
distribution of perceived quality depends on the primitives in the model: (i)
the cost of high perceived quality K (ah), (ii) the degree of horizontal product
differentiation μ, (iii) and order of entry. My results can be summarized as
follows:
Quality costs A benefit of assuming an step response in aim is that only two
levels of perceived quality need to be considered and that the results in
this section can be derived with an arbitrary cost function. Yarrow (1989)
considers the specific case of K (a) = exp(a), and also finds that asymmetric
quality choices may emerge. He does not consider the geographic patterns in
CPG brand competition, the effect of sequential quality choices, or as we do
momentarily, multimarket contact.
π1π2




















Fig. 2 Convexity of profits in quality and asymmetric equilibria. a One market. b Two markets
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Horizontal differentiation Asymmetric choices of perceived quality emerge
more generally when goods are horizontally undifferentiated. The intuition
behind this dependence on μ is that when goods are undifferentiated and
quality perceptions are expensive to obtain, there is only “room” for one high
quality player in the market. The low quality player realizes there is nothing to
gain from imitating the high quality player. In CPG industries, where demand
expansion is small compared to gains from substitution, copying the high
quality player would result in lower demand and lower margins than the high
quality player currently has. These beliefs about expected profits from quality
improvements effectively turn the investment in perceived quality by the first
mover into a “barrier to copy”.
Order of entry When firms move sequentially in setting quality perceptions,
the asymmetric equilibria are characterized by the first mover taking the higher
quality positioning. In Moorthy (1988), the asymmetric equilibrium is also
interpreted to offer a possible advantage to the first entrant. However, in my
case, a first mover advantage in perceived quality only emerges strategically
when μ is small enough, i.e., only when products that are horizontally sim-
ilar. In cases with a higher degree of horizontal differentiation, the analysis
suggest that perceptual differences will be absent or competed away. Perhaps
consistent with this prediction, Golder and Tellis (1993) report that first mover
advantages are larger and more persistent for non-durable products than for
durable products.
Products are objectively similar in many CPG industries. But, at some cost,
perceived quality, retail support, or brand awareness of these products can
be adjusted. Our arguments suggest that brand competition under this set
of circumstances fosters the emergence of asymmetric brand shares within a
market. In addition, these quality adjustments can be made at a local level.
CPG products are rolled out gradually over geography and the identity of firms
who can choose first whether to invest in quality or not, often differs across
different regions (see, e.g., Bronnenberg et al. 2006). In turn, our arguments
suggest that this set of circumstances fosters the emergence of asymmetric
brands shares across markets.
5.4 The vertical model
A special case occurs when μ = 0. This section points out that the prices and
quality levels from the logit demand model when μ ≥ 0 are right continuous
in μ so that the pure vertical case is a limiting case of the logit demand system
already analyzed.





1 if a1 − p1 > a2 − p2
1/2 if a1 − p1 = a2 − p2
0 if a1 − p1 < a2 − p2
, (11)
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where demand is shared between the two players if consumers have the same
utility for the two products. Demand for firm 2 is the complement of s1 . What
is the outcome of the quality-game in this case? Assume again that a two stage
game is played, wherein quality is chosen first and prices second. We maintain
the same assumptions about perceived quality, i.e., quality perceptions can be
ah or a with ah > a, and with a the resulting quality perception when no
quality investments are made (K (a) = 0).
Consider a candidate equilibrium where one player chooses ah and charges
an arbitrary amount less than ph = c + ah − a, whereas the other sets quality
at a and charges p = c. At these prices, demand for the first firm is 1 and the
demand for the second firm is 0.
Given the asymmetric choices for quality, can either of the players improve
their profits by changing price? The first player will not raise prices because it
will loose its demand to the second player. It will also not cut prices because
doing so decreases margins but does not raise demand which is already 1.
The second player will not lower prices for it would sell under cost. It will
not increase prices because profits will not rise from doing so. Consequently,
neither has a profit incentive to choose a different price, i.e., the prices are
subgame perfect.
Next, consider quality choices. At the candidate equilibrium, the first player
will capture all demand. At the price ph = c + ah − a, it makes a profit
contribution (before fixed cost) of (p − c) · s = ah − a. So, as long as the
investment in quality does not exceed ah − a, the first player will invest in high
quality perceptions. In contrast, the second player will not invest in quality,
because at the quality chosen by firm 1, it can maximally charge c and hence its
profit contribution is 0. It will effectively sit idle, positioning at a and charging
c but not actually sell anything. Thus, in the pure vertical model, asymmetric
positioning is an equilibrium.
These prices and qualities of the vertical model turn out to be equal to the
limiting prices and qualities of the logit model. This can be checked as follows.
Equation 8 shows that the optimal price under logit demand is c + μ/ (1 − s).
From the definition of , we can rewrite this as c + μ (1 + ) for the high
quality player and c + μ (1 + −1) for the low quality player. Using the proof
of Proposition 5, it can be shown that these prices tend to c + ah − a and c
(the asymmetric prices in the vertical model) as μ approaches 0 . The quality
choices derived in Propositions 5 continue to hold in the case when μ = 0.
Namely, the central condition on cost in Proposition 5, that is μ
(
1 − −1) ≤
K (ah) ≤ μ ( − 1) , limits to 0 ≤ K (ah) ≤ ah − a. Indeed, from the discussion
above, if the cost for the high quality player is in this interval, an asymmetric
equilibrium exists. In the same vein, it is easily checked that the result from
Proposition 6 continues to hold, except that the first case in this proposition
never applies at μ = 0.
In sum, the logit demand model with quality choices continuously ap-
proaches the vertical model as μ limits to 0. This section demonstrates that
in addition to demand, the asymmetric equilibrium prices and quality levels
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implied by the logit demand model also limit to those of the vertical model as
products get more and more similar, i.e., as μ limits to 0.
6 Sustaining historical asymmetries through multi-market contact
An independent but reinforcing argument for the results in the previous
section arises from the practice, common in the domestic CPG sector, that
firms meet each other in multiple markets. This creates the possibility of
coordination between firms (Bernheim and Whinston 1990). To provide an
analytic foundation for a discussion about collusive multi-market equilibria, I
make the following assumptions.
First, there are two firms, two markets, and again two levels of perceived
quality: high (ah) and low (a).
Second, as is usual in a multi-market contact framework, firms are allowed
to interact repeatedly over time (Bernheim and Whinston 1990; Karnani and
Wernerfelt 1985),6 and, in this case, for an infinite number of periods.
Third, each firm is endowed with one market in which it is the sole provider
of a high perceived quality product and one market in which it is the sole
provider of a lower perceived quality product. This pre-existing condition is
exogenous to the analysis. The subsequent analysis therefore applies to the
local advantages of the type previously derived, but it is noteworthy to observe
that it also applies to a broad class of other local advantages, including those
that are fleeting.
Fourth, to demonstrate that multimarket contact and repeated interaction
broadens the cases where asymmetric equilibria occur, I rule out the cost
explanation of the previous section and consider the case where firms can
increase perceived quality at no cost, i.e., K (ah) = K (a) = 0. This constitutes
the scenario where single market firms are tempted in the short run to choose
a high perceived quality level ah. The idea behind this assumption is that
if asymmetries are sustainable in a multimarket setting, even if it is free to
improve quality, they will surely be sustainable if it is costly to improve from a
low to a high perceived quality brand.
Firms each maximize multi-market profits by choosing perceived quality aim
first and setting prices pim next. Figure 2b shows the profit functions π of firms
1 and 2, in a two-market scenario. In the market where firm 1 is positioned at ah
(and firm 2 at a) it makes a profit of C. In the other market it is positioned at
a (and firm 2 at ah) and makes profits of A. However, if it is free to do so, firm
1 will be tempted to improve quality in the market where it is lagging, because
this increases its current multimarket profit (i.e., B + C > A + C). I assume
that the consequence of not colluding is to remain positioned symmetrically
6Comparisons to the single period single market game in the previous section are thus not
immediate. However, unless consumers accept the idea of each firm taking periodic turns at being
the “high-quality” player, a single market repeated game will result in the same equilibrium as the
single period game.
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in both markets at ah forever. First, this is optimal in the short run, if ah
comes at no cost. Second, this is consistent with the idea that when firms have
eliminated the perceived quality gap between two brands, such a gap is not
easily recreated. In sum, firms in this argument are represented as trading off
the benefits of an immediate profit improvement in their lagging market from
A to B with future profit deterioration in strong markets from C to B.
Let π∗ denote multimarket profits with asymmetric positioning, i.e., π∗ =
A + C = (−1 + )μ − 2K (with  as defined before). The payoff for a
one-time deviation for firm 1 is πd = B + C = (1 + )μ − 2K. After firm 2
observes that it is attacked in its best market by firm 1, next period it optimally
repositions in market 1 from a to ah. The payoff for both firms is now equal to
π0 = B + B = 2μ − 2K forever. The following proposition holds:
Proposition 7 (multimarket contact)
1. If both firms each have a market in which they lead, they both make more
profits than if they share each market equally.
2. The minimum discount factor, i.e., future valuation, that makes that firms do
not deviate in the short term and sustain the local asymmetries, is equal to the
ratio of each firm’s smaller and larger market share, i.e., δ∗ = πd−π∗
πd−π0 = −1
3. The minimum discount factor needed to sustain local asymmetries (δ∗)
increases monotonically from 0 in μ, the degree of product differentiation.
Proof see Appendix unionsq
The first part of the proposition states that π∗i > π
0
i , i.e., that there is
always a profit incentive to sustain the combination of a market with a quality
advantage and a market with a quality disadvantage. This result is implied by
Proposition 2. Going back to that proposition, with asymmetric positioning for
both firms in both markets, the perceived quality gap in market 1 is ah − a
to firm 1, whereas in market 2 it is −ah + a. The positioning difference when
both competitors position at ah is equal to 0 in both markets. It follows from
Proposition 2 that for both firms π(ah − a) + π(−ah + a) > 2π (0).
The second part of the proposition conveys that in order for the multimarket
collusion to hold, the discount rate has to exceed −1. Recall that  is the ratio
of the share of the high perceived quality player to that of the low perceived
quality player. It was shown that this ratio is larger than 1, and, thus, it that
0 < δ∗ < 1. As a matter of interpretation, the more asymmetric existing shares
are, the less forward looking managers need to be to sustain them.
The third part of the proposition is based on the result that ∂δ∗/∂μ > 0.
This result implies that as markets are less and less differentiated, even myopic
managers will resist the temptation to reposition to gain higher perceived
quality in their “low perceived quality” market. This is for 2 reasons. First, the
post-deviation drop in profits C − B in Fig. 2 from competing head-to-head will
become larger with less product differentiation, i.e., the long term punishment
increases. Second, the short term incentive to deviate B − A will go to zero as
μ becomes smaller, i.e., the short term benefit of deviation decreases.
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The interpretation of this result is that once a CPG industry has a geographic
distribution of leading brands, for instance because order-of-entry was geo-
graphically distributed (Bronnenberg et al. 2006), these leading brands have
an incentive not to compete too fiercely in the markets where they are lagging
for fear of “commoditizing” the market, which would make all firms worse off
in the future.
7 Discussion
7.1 Interpretation of different equilibria
To summarize the different cases considered in this paper, Fig. 3 outlines
the equilibria that exist for alternative values of the three variables of our
competitive analysis of the CPG industry: (i) the costs of creating local
perceived quality K (ah) , (ii) the degree of objective horizontal differentiation
μ, and (iii) the sequence of choosing quality.7 To visualize the results, we use
a numerical example. The numerical scenario considered here uses ah = 1 and
a = 0.8
Zone I outlines the cases where the cost K (ah) of positioning high is so large
that both products position low in all markets. Because it does not pay to invest
in a single market, there is no profit incentive to invest in a multimarket contact
framework either (markets are assumed to be separated and independent).
Zone II represents the cases covered in Section 5 where a single-market
asymmetric equilibrium exists. The graph illustrates Proposition 5 (part 5),
i.e., that the range of K (ah) over which asymmetric equilibria are obtained
becomes smaller as μ increases. Per the same proposition, the range will
eventually shrink from [0 ah − a] (in the numerical example [0 1]) for small
values of μ, to a single point (ah − a) /3 (in the numerical example 1/3) for
large values of μ. Because asymmetric positioning is an equilibrium in a single
market, when the two firms compete independently on more than one market,
a particular firm may lead in all markets, in several, or in none, depending
on local entry patterns. If order of entry across these markets is spatially
dependent, regional dominance by firms across a set of local markets will
emerge.
Zone III covers the cases where the cost K (ah) of positioning at high
perceived quality is so small that in a single market all products would
position at ah. However, realizing that they are better off having monopoly
power in at least a fraction of the markets, in a multi-market context firms
maintain asymmetric positions if they share local leadership and value the
future enough. The results of Proposition 7 are represented in this graph by
7For completeness, the discount rate δ is a fourth variable, but its role is not central to the analysis.
8The discussion does not seem to be affected by other numerical choices for ah and a.
Brand competition in CPG industries: Sustaining large local advantages. . . 97
Fig. 3 Equilibria for product
differentiation μ, and cost
K (ah)






















zone I: Symmetric positioning 
at lower quality
zone II: First entrant positions at high quality. 
Second entrant positions at low quality.
zone III: Asymmetric positioning 
with multi–market contact
zone IV: Symmetric posi-
tioning at higher quality
the asymmetric positioning that occurs along the horizontal axis, i.e., when
K (ah) = 0. In a single market setting this does not happen (i.e., there is no
support of Zone II on the horizontal axis). For completeness, Fig. 3 was created
with δ = 0.75. Thus even if firms only value next period’s profits at 75% of
current profits, the area over which asymmetric positioning emerges (zone III)
relative to a single market case, is very substantial.
Finally, zone IV contains all cases where firms position at ah in all markets.
As the firm’s value for future profits increases, the importance of the fourth
zone diminishes further.
Zones II and III combine to give all cases where asymmetric positioning
equilibria may occur. One of the central results of the analysis is that the
occurrence of asymmetric equilibria is strongly dependent on horizontal dif-
ferentiation. Indeed, Fig. 3 illustrates once more that sustained asymmetric
market shares as in Fig. 1 is more likely to happen with undifferentiated than
with differentiated goods.
A few elaborations of these results exist, which I mention here without
proof. First, it can be shown that the presence of an outside good does
not affect Fig. 3 substantively, as long as the outside good is not too large.
Second, the main results of the paper are not materially affected if we consider
competition in more than 2 markets even when the markets in which firms
lead are not divided equally across competitors. Third and finally, the base
scenario in the multimarket case contained the assumption that improvements
in perceived quality come at no costs. Relaxing this assumption makes that
the multimarket argument holds stronger. That is to say, for multimarket
competition with K (ah) > 0, the same result as before is obtained, except that




min:0.29   max:0.45
General Mills
min:0.25   max:0.36
Fig. 4 Local market share of two leading manufacturers in cereals
7.2 An empirical example
Conversely, the study implies that incentives to create and sustain perceived
quality differentiation are less strong when products are horizontally differ-
entiated. For discussion purposes, I present one example of such a category:
breakfast cereals. Breakfast cereals are a good example of a horizontally
differentiated category (see also Nevo 2001) because consumers are capable
of distinguishing the different products sold, say, Corn Flakes and Cheerios,
and there is no common preference ordering.
The arguments presented here predict that there should be much variation
in local shares in the Mexican salsa category but not in the cereal category.
If, in addition, the main brands in both industries are roughly symmetric (e.g.,
if the national brand pairs are of similar objective quality and all cater to the
mass market), then the local ratio between the leading brand’s share and the
second brand’s share is predicted to be large in the case of Mexican salsas but
close to unity for the breakfast cereals. Figures 1 and 4 show that this is indeed
what happens.9
Table 1 presents three measures of share asymmetry across and within
markets for the Mexican salsa and breakfast cereal industries. The first and
second measure quantify share asymmetries within markets. In the competi-
tion between Pace and Tostitos, the average size of the local leader is 2.65 that
of the second brand. In the competition between Cornflakes and Cheerios, this
ratio is 1.35 (1.22 in the competition between Kellogg and General Mills).10 In
the case of Mexican salsa, the leading brand is twice as large as the lagging
brand in almost half of the markets. In the case of breakfast cereals this
occurs not even once. The third measure is the standard deviation across
markets of the log share ratio. It quantifies whether market share leadership
and dominance is constant across markets. A large value on this ratio is an
9The figure for breakfast cereal brands as opposed to manufacturers is very similar to Fig. 4.
10This measure can be redefined to reflect differences in the national shares of brands. That is, if
the national brands are not symmetric, we use within market asymmetries adjusted for the national
asymmetry in share. These adjustments do not materially change the example in the table.
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Table 1 Differences in spatial variability and asymmetry
Mexican salsa Breakfast cereals
Campbell (Pace) vs. Kellogg vs Corn Flakes vs













Standard deviation (log(share ratiom)) 0.90 0.16 0.32
indication that both brands have their own geographic territory of high-share
markets in direct competition with each other.11 From Table 1, it is clear that
the measure of spatial variability is much larger in the Mexican salsa than in
the breakfast cereal industry.
In sum, the contrast between these industries presents an empirical example
of one theoretical implication of the analysis. Future research could consider
a more extensive empirical analysis of the relation between product similarity
and local share asymmetry.
8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that local asymmetries can arise with little or no objec-
tive product differentiation and may be sustained under conditions commonly
observed in CPG industries: the leading national brands sell objectively similar
products, order of entry and investments in perceived quality are local, and
firms compete on perceived quality and price in multiple markets.
There are many reasons why competing firms of undifferentiated goods face
different initial conditions in a given market, e.g., order-of-entry effects on
brand perceptions (e.g., Bronnenberg et al. 2006) or on shelf-space (Bowman
and Gatignon 1996; Robinson and Fornell 1985). These phenomena can lead to
initial differences in market shares and profitability. The analysis in this paper
suggests that such “initial market conditions,” e.g., product launch strategies
and early differences in perceived quality matter especially in undifferentiated
categories. They are therefore strategically important in CPG industries, where
consumer related arguments for asymmetric market shares are often relatively
weak. If goods are the same, initial market conditions persist, whereas if prod-
ucts are differentiated, these initial market conditions will not be sustainable.
In the latter case, all competitors tend to compete for a “fair share” in all local
markets.
There are several areas for future research. First, in the present paper, I
assumed the presence of only two brands. Whereas duopolies do of course
11It is noted that a low value is not evidence of the absence of local asymmetries, but rather of the
absence of geographic differences in the asymmetries.
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duopolies exist, there is value in analyzing the case of more entrants. Second,
in my model, consumer preferences are static. In this model, local brand
advantages are sustained because firms have a long term incentive to maintain
consumer perceptions of quality differentiation. That is, the persistence of
the quality differences within a market is driven by firms. An alternative
argument, beyond the scope of this paper, but worthwhile for future study,
is that consumer perceptions or advertising effects are sticky (e.g., Doraszelski
and Markovich 2007; Dubé et al. 2006). Although speculative, positive carry-
over in consumer preferences and firms’ competition in multiple markets
may interact to produce even more stable asymmetric outcomes than those
found here.
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Appendix: Proofs








] + exp [(−p2)/μ
] , a = a1 − a2 (12)
Some useful relations are ds1dp1 = − 1μ s1(1 − s1), ds1dp2 = 1μ s1s2, ds1da = 1μ s1(1 − s1).
Taking the first order condition for firm 1 gives,
F(p1, p2, a) ≡ p1 − c1 − μ1 − s1 = 0 (13)
The total differential of this function is Fp1 dp1 + Fp2 dp2 + Fada = 0. Writing
 ≡ s1/s2, it is easy to show that
Fp1 = 1 − μ · d (1 − s1)
−1
dp1
= 1 − μ (1 − s1)−2 ds1dp1 = 1 +  (14)
It can further be shown that Fp2 and Fa are both equal to −. Substitution in
the total differential for F gives
(1 + ) dp1 − dp2 − da = 0 (15)
Brand competition in CPG industries: Sustaining large local advantages. . . 101
Now, totally differentiate the first order condition for firm 2.
G(p1, p2, a) ≡ p2 − c2 − μs1 = 0 (16)
The total differential of this function is Gp1 dp1 + Gp2dp2 + Gada = 0. Once
more it is easy to show that
Gp1 = − 1

, Gp2 = 1 + 1

, Ga = 1

(17)










da = 0 (18)









1 +  + 2 < 0. (19)
This proofs Proposition 1. The result states further that changes in a are never
priced by the firm to the market completely. Indeed, it may be noted from the
definition of  that the sensitivity of p1 to changes in a is always between 0
and 1. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Once again, the subscript m is dropped from the nota-
tion. It needs to be shown that the profits of both firms are convex in a. Thus,
the second order derivative of profits with respect to a needs to be evaluated













> 0, i = 1, 2, (20)
where the last equality relation follows from Eq. 6. To simplify the derivation,
I can use the expressions in Eq. 19 and take the derivative of both expressions








with fi() given by the RHS of Eq. 19. It can be shown that
df1()
d
= 2 + 
2
(




= 2 + 1(
1 +  + 2)2
> 0 (22)
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Recalling that  = exp [(−p1 + p2 + a) /μ
]
, the derivative d/da of the ratio





































1 +  + 2 > 0 (24)
Substitution of Eqs. 22 and 23 into Eq. 21 proves that the profits of both firms
are convex in a. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 Without loss in generality, drop the market subscript
m, and define a = a1 − a2. Note that,
d2πi
d (a) d (μ)
= d
2p∗i
d (a) d (μ)
(25)
Using Eq. 19, I can write,
d2πi









> 0, and therefore the sign of the LHS of Eq. 26 is equal
to the sign of
d
dμ
. Rearrange the definition of  at optimal prices to obtain the
implicit equation that





with p∗1 − c = μ/(1− s1) = μ(1 + ), p∗2 − c = μ/(1− s2) = μ(1 + −1). Thus,




−  + 1
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)
. From this equation, take the deriva-





































1 +  + 2) , (29)
Brand competition in CPG industries: Sustaining large local advantages. . . 103
which is strictly negative (positive) as long as a > 0 (a < 0). Now, going back
to Eq. 26, I get for firm i
d2πi








< 0 if a > 0
> 0 if a < 0
(30)
Thus, the smaller μ, the more (less) profits rise in quality for the quality leader
(lagger). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 This result is implied by Proposition 1. If both firms
have high perceived quality they both set prices of c + 2μ. These prices stem
from p∗i = ci + μ/(1 − si), and from the obvious result that if both have the
same positioning si = 1/2. It is easily verified that there are no unilateral
deviations from this proposed equilibrium. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5
1. Proof is given in the text preceding Proposition 1
(a) It needs to be shown that μ ( − 1) − μ (1 − −1) is decreasing in
μ. First, from the text preceding the proposition, μ ( − 1) and
μ
(
1 − −1) may be interpreted as the profit before quality invest-
ment for the high quality and low quality firm, respectively. Without
loss in generality, firm 1 invests in local branding and firm 2 does not.





























Taking derivatives with respect to μ, and using Proposition 3 gives
















dα < 0 (33)
(b) It is obvious that limμ↓0 μ
(
1 − −1) = 0. Applying l’Hopital’s rule to
limμ↓0 μ ( − 1) , I get
lim
μ↓0








1 +  + 2) = (ah − a) (34)
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For μ → ∞, again, applying l’Hopital’s rule,
lim



























This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 Suppose that firms set quality sequentially, with firm 1
choosing first. Depending on the combination of firm 1’s and firm 2’s quality
choices, firm 2 receives at optimal prices, payoffs π2(a1, a2) as follows:
π2(ah, ah) = μ − K (ah) if a1 = ah, a2 = ah
π2(a, ah) = μ − K (ah) if a1 = a, a2 = ah
π2(ah, a) = −1μ − K (a) if a1 = ah, a2 = a
π2(a, a) = μ − K (a) if a1 = a, a2 = a (37)






π2(ah, ah), and a2 = ah if μ
(
1 − −1) > K (ah)
π2(ah, a), and a2 = a if μ
(
1 − −1) < K (ah)
, (38)





π2(a, ah), and a2 = ah if μ ( − 1) > K (ah)




1 − −1) ≤ ( − 1) . Given that firm 1 moves first, it can use all this
knowledge. To do so it has to consider three scenarios.
1. Case I: K (ah) < μ
(
1 − −1) where firm 2 always plays ah. In this case, firm
1 also plays ah.
2. Case II: μ
(
1 − −1) < K (ah) < μ ( − 1) , where firm 2 always plays the
opposite of firm 1 . If firm 1 plays ah, then firm 2 plays a, and firm 1’s
profit is μ − K (ah) . If firm 1 plays a then firm 2 plays ah and firm 1’s
profits are μ−1 − K (a) . Hence firm 1 will play ah if profits are higher
than when playing a, i.e., μ − K (ah) > μ−1 − K (a) , or:
K (ah) < μ
(
 − −1) (40)
Is this always true in case II? Case II implies that μ
(
1 − −1) < K (ah) <
μ ( − 1) . Because μ ( − 1) < μ ( − −1) , K (ah) < μ ( − 1) implies
Brand competition in CPG industries: Sustaining large local advantages. . . 105
that K (ah) < μ
(
 − −1). Hence, with asymmetric equilibria (case II),
firm 1 will always position at ah.
3. Case III: K (ah) > μ ( − 1) , where firm 2 always plays a. In this case, it
is easy to see that firm 1 plays a. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7
1. Let firm 1 be positioned at ah in market 1 while firm 2 is positioned
at a. In market 2 the opposite happens. Denote the ratio of output of
product 1 to that of product 2 at optimal prices in market 1 again by
 ≡ s∗11/s∗21. Further, denote the equilibrium profits of firm i by π∗i ≡∑
m π
∗
im = π∗i1 + π∗i2. Given equal cost, the prices of products mirror each
other across markets, i.e. p∗11 = p∗22, and p∗12 = p∗21. From the definition of
the ratio of outputs, it is therefore obvious that in market 2, s∗12/s
∗
22 = −1.
By Proposition 1,  > 1, i.e., in market 1, firm 1 is the product with the
higher perceived quality, prices, and demand. Equations 5 and 6 give that
π∗im =
sim
1 − sim · μ − K (41)






 + −1)μ − 2K, i = 1, 2. (42)
From this formulation it is clear that multimarket profit is lowest when
 = 1. Therefore the following inequality always holds
μ + μ−1 − 2K ≥ 2μ − 2K. (43)
2. The second part of the proposition implies that existing reciprocal asym-
metries are sustainable – even when breaking them is free – as long as firms
value future profits sufficiently. Specifically, firm 1 resists the temptation to
reposition from a to ah if a periodic profit of π∗i , is valued higher than a
one time profit of πdi followed by a periodic profit of π
0
i . This valuation is
met for all discount rates δ that satisfy
π∗i (1 + δ + δ2 + · · · ) > πdi + π0i (δ + δ2 + δ3 · · · ). (44)




firm 1 does not reposition. By symmetry,
the same holds for firm 2.
3. I need to show that dδ
∗
dμ > 0 or equivalently that
d
dμ < 0 as long as  > 1.
This was already shown in Eq. 29 unionsq
References
Anderson, S. P., & de Palma, A. (2001). Product diversity in asymmetric oligopoly: Is the quality
of consumer goods too low? The Journal of International Economics, 49, 113–135.
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A., & Thisse, J.-F. (1992). Discrete choice theory of product differentia-
tion. Cambridge: MIT Press.
106 B.J. Bronnenberg
Bagwell, K. (2007). The economic analysis of advertising. In R. Porter & M. Armstrong (Eds.),
Handbook of industrial organization, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., & Pakes, A. (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium.
Econometrica, 63(4), 841–890, July.
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1990). Multi-market contact and collusive behavior. RAND
Journal of Economics, 21(1), 1–26, Spring.
Bettman, J. R., & Park, C. W. (1980). Effects of prior knowledge and experience and phase of
the choice process on consumer decision processes: A protocol analysis. Journal of Consumer
Research, 7, 234–48, December.
Bowman, D., & Gatignon, H. (1996). Order of entry as a moderator of the effect of the marketing
mix on market share. Marketing Science, 15(3), 222–242.
Bronnenberg, B. J., Dhar, S., & Dubé, J.-P. (2006). Market structure and the geographic distribution
of brand shares in consumer package goods industries. Working paper.
Caplin, A., & Nalebuff, B. (1991). Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence of
equilibrium. Econometrica, 59, 26–61.
Carpenter, G. S., Glazer, R., & Nakamoto, K. (1994). Meaningful brands from meaningless
differentiation: The dependence on irrelevant attributes. Journal of Marketing Research,
31(3), 339–350, August.
Caves, R. E., & Greene, D. P. (1996). Brands’ quality levels, prices and advertising outlays:
Empirical evidence on signals and information costs. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 14, 29–52.
Comanor, W. S., & Wilson, T. A. (1974). Advertising and market power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J.-F. (1979). On hotelling’s “stability in competition”.
Econometrica, 47, 1145–1150.
Dickson, P., & Sawyer, A. G. (1990). The price knowledge and search of supermarket shoppers.
Journal of Marketing, 54, 42–53, July.
Doraszelski, U., & Markovich, S. (2007). Advertising dynamics and competitive advantage. RAND
Journal of Economics, (forthcoming).
Dubé, J.-P. H., Hitsch, G. J., & Manchanda, P. (2005). An empirical model of advertising dynamics.
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 3(2), 107–144.
Dubé, J.-P. H., Hitsch, G. J., & Rossi, P. E. (2006). Do switching costs make markets less compet-
itive. University of Chicago, working paper.
Golder, P. N., & Tellis, G. J. (1993). Pioneer advantage: Marketing logic or marketing legend?
Journal of Marketing Research, 30, 158–70, May.
Hoyer, W. D. (1984). An examination of consumer decision making for a common repeat purchase
product. Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 822–829, December.
Hoyer, W. D., & Brown, S. P. (1990). Effects of brand awareness on choice for a common, repeat-
purchase product. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 141–148, September.
Karnani, A., & Wernerfelt, B. (1985). Multiple point competition. Strategic Management Journal,
6, 87–96.
Kirmani, A., & Wright, P. (1989). Money talks: Perceived advertising expense and expected
product quality. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(3), 344–353.
Little, J. D. C. (1979). Aggregate advertising models: The state of the art. Operations Research,
23(4), 628–673, July-August.
Moorthy, K. S. (1988). Product and price competition in a duopoly. Marketing Science, 7(2),
141–165, Spring.
Neven, D., & Thisse, J.-F. (1990). On quality and variety competition. In J. J. Gabszewicz,
J.-F. Richard, & L. A. Wolsey (Eds.), Economic decision-making: Games, econometrics, and
optimisation. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Nevo, A. (2001). Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal category. Econometrica,
69(2), 307–342.
Nijs, V. R., Dekimpe, M. G., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Hanssens, D. M. (2002). The category
demand effects of price promotions. Marketing Science, 20(1), 1–22, Winter.
Park, C. W., & Lessig, V. P. (1981). Familiarity and its impact on consumer biases and heuristics.
Journal of Consumer Research, 8, 223–230, September.
Robinson, W. T., & Fornell, C. (1985). Sources of market pioneer advantages in consumer goods
industries. Journal of Marketing Research, 22, 305–317, August.
Brand competition in CPG industries: Sustaining large local advantages. . . 107
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1981). Relaxing price competition through product differentiation.
Review of Economic Studies, 49, 3–13.
Simonson, I. (1993). Get closer to your customers by understanding how they make choices.
California Management Review, 35(4), 68–84, Summer.
Soberman, D. (2002). Questioning conventional wisdom about competition in differentiated
markets. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 3(1), 41–70.
Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk costs and market structure. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Trout, J., & Rivkin, S. (2000). Differentiate or die. New York, NY: Wiley.
Villas-Boas, J. M. (1993). Predicting advertising pulsing policies in an oligopoly: A model and
empirical test. Marketing Science, 12, 88–102.
Yarrow, G. (1989). The Kellogg’s Cornflakes equilibrium and related issues. Hertford College,
Oxford, working paper.
